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Abstract
A smart contract enforces specific performance on anonymous users without
centralization. It facilitates payment equity in commerce by providing irre-
versible transactions. Smart contracts are also used for illegal activities such
as money laundering and ransomware. Such contracts include criminal smart
contracts (CSCs), proposed in CCS’16, that can be efficiently implemented in
existing scripting languages. This aggravates concerns about the dangers of C-
SCs. However, PublicLeaks, a CSC for leaking private data, is conditionally
implemented as it is influenced by various factors. For example, PublicLeaks
does not necessarily reach a desirable terminal state for a criminal leaking pri-
vate information, and other possible terminal states may invalidate the CSC.
In this study, we propose a CSC based on PublicLeaks by formulating ran-
dom factors such as the donation ratio. Our contract forks into five terminal
states, including a unique one in PublicLeaks due to randomness. We simulated
the maximal probabilities of these terminal states and found that the desirable
terminal state in PublicLeaks is reachable with low probabilities (lower than
25%). The terminal state where the criminal fails to leak private information
is attained with relatively high probabilities (over 65%). Therefore, our simu-
lations show that CSCs are not always as powerful as expected, and the risk
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posed by them can be mitigated.
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1. Introduction
A smart contract is “a set of promises, specified in digital form, including
protocols within which the parties perform on these promises [39]. They may
enforce specific activities such as addressing financial fraud [18, 49], e-voting [27],
bug bounty [7] and the blockchain-Internet of things (IoT) combination [11, 29,5
31, 44, 45, 50]. Moreover, they can be applied to cloud computing to enforce
payments [41, 9, 10]. However, smart contracts may cause significant damage if
they are targeted by criminals [22, 36, 42, 5]. Smart contracts, although widely
used, are far from perfect because of potential security issues [46, 28, 47]. For
instance, in June 2016, the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) was10
attacked, resulting in the loss of approximately USD 60 million.
Smart contracts face two types of security issues: internal security concerns
and external attacks (see Table 1). The former refers to security concerns within
smart contracts and the latter, attacks implemented by smart contracts. Luu
et al. proposed new security problems in smart contracts and enhanced their15
robustness [30]. Kosba et al. [23] proposed a decentralized system called Hawk
that guarantees the privacy of smart contracts. Bhargavan et al. verified the
runtime safety and correctness of smart contracts by translating them into F*
[4]. Atzei et al. surveyed attacks launched using Ethereum smart contracts [3].
They discussed the problem of security vulnerabilities and provided a taxono-20
my of programming pitfalls. Dika proposed an updated taxonomy of all known
vulnerabilities [13] and investigated security code analysis tools in Ethereum, in-
cluding Oyente, Securify, and SmartCheck. Nikolic´ et al. [33] recently analyzed
nearly one million contracts and reported that 34,200 of them were vulnerable;
they implemented the MAIAN tool for concrete validation and manual analysis.25
In addition to these internal security concerns, smart contracts are vulner-
able to exploitation for illegal purposes. Velner et al. proposed an attack im-
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plemented by smart contracts in which the adversary can destroy mining pools
[43]. Juels et al. [22] discussed criminal smart contracts (CSCs) that can be
efficiently implemented on Ethereum and called for policy-related and technical30
safeguards for beneficial smart contracts [22]. Brunoni and Beaudet-Labrecque
studied smart contracts in detail in the context of cybercrime [8]. Alharby and
Moorse claimed that no solution has been proposed to solve the problems posed
by CSCs [2]. This has increased concerns about smart contracts. No measure
appears sufficient to prevent the threat posed by smart contracts, especially35
CSCs. Bigi et al. provided a formal method to verify the validation of smart
contracts using game theory [6]. They analyzed the effects of uncertainty intro-
duced by deposits on systems. Specifically, they used PRISM [16] to clarify the
specific actions of protocols. Their work inspired discussions on the validation
of smart contracts.40
Table 1: Security issues in smart contracts.
Internal security concerns External attacks
[3][33] Vulnerabilities [2] CSCs
[4] Correctness [6][33] Validation
[13] Unknown vulnerabilities [8] Smart contracts in cybercrime
[23] Privacy [22] CSCs
[30] Robust [43] Destroy mining pools
The main task in decentralized platforms is to enforce trust among people in
the absence of a centralized entity [20, 19, 21]. Some specific problems become
easier if the entities trust one another, such as through encryption schemes [48,
15] and malware detection [40]. Motivated by [22] [6], we revisit the validation
of CSCs [22] in this study to consider a specific one, PublicLeaks, in which45
a dealer manages to illegally leak private information. Juels et al. claimed
that PublicLeaks is efficiently implemented in Ethereum [22]. The terminal
state here means the end state of a smart contract. PublicLeaks has a unique
terminal state Ssucc in which a dealer leaks private information or a secret after
collecting sufficient donations. Other terminal states are available for a smart50
contract to leak a secret. For example, one terminal state is when the donation
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is insufficient to leak a given secret. Such terminal states derive from uncertain
factors like the donation ratio. Furthermore, the dealer may cheat during the
execution of a smart contract. All of these factors should be considered. The
main contributions of this paper are as follows:55
• We revisit the contract PublicLeaks [22] and follow the intuition that
there is more than one terminal state in CSCs. This is because uncer-
tain factors may bias contracts to a variety of end states. Therefore,
PublicLeaks is conditionally established owing to random factors even
though it can be efficiently implemented in Ethereum.60
• We study several random factors that can influence the validity of PublicLeaks
and accordingly propose a CSC called PublicLeaksRandom. This new con-
tract has five terminal states, including Ssucc of PublicLeaks.
• The maximum probabilities of each terminal state in PublicLeaksRandom
were simulated using PRISM. The results show that the maximum prob-65
ability of reaching Ssucc in PublicLeaksRandom was not high (no more
than 25%). Furthermore, the probability of terminal state Send in which
the dealer fails to leak secrets was relatively high (over 65%). Therefore,
the dealer cannot implement CSCs, and the threat posed by them can be
mitigated.70
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the ba-
sic framework of PublicLeaks [22] and extends it to PublicLeaksRandom by in-
troducing randomness. Compared with the unique terminal state of PublicLeaks,
PublicLeaksRandom has five terminal states in case a secret is leaked. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the maximal probabilities of reaching each terminal state in75
PublicLeaksRandom. Simulation results show that the unique terminal state in
PublicLeaks was reached with relatively low probability, thereby reducing the
power of CSCs. Furthermore, the maximal probability of reaching the terminal
state in which leaking fails was high. These results show that CSCs are not as
powerful as expected, and their validity is undermined by randomness in the80
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real world. Finally, Section 4 presents our conclusions as well as directions for
future work in the study area.
2. Smart contract with randomness
2.1. Basic framework in [22]
In [22], the authors claimed that it is possible to leak a secret and collect do-85
nations by using smart contracts. We restate the basic workflow of PublicLeaks
for the sake of clarity.
• S1: The dealer divides film f (without copyright) into n segments fi
(i ∈ [1, n]), encrypts each segment fi with secret key si, and sends them
to the contract.90
• S2: The interested audience downloads all encrypted segments c = {ci}i∈[1,n] =
{Encki(fi)}i∈[1,n] from the contract.
• S3: The contract selects subset n′ ⊂ [1, n] of n, and the dealer reveals the
secret keys corresponding to n′.
• S4: The audience donates money to the contract once it has successfully95
decrypted the segments using the revealed keys.
• S5: The dealer decrypts all segments if he/she collects enough donations.
Otherwise, he/she prefers to wait.
• Ssucc: At the end of the contract, the dealer has collected enough money
to sell the film, where the smart contract guarantees payment.100
Figure 1 shows six state transitions corresponding to the above steps. Let Si
denote the label of each state and Ssucc, the terminal state in which the dealer
successfully releases the film. Circle and rectangle nodes respectively denote
nonterminal and terminal states; terminal states are reached once the dealer
has collected a sufficient amount of donations.105
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Figure 1: State transitions of PublicLeaks.
2.2. Reconstruction of criminal smart contract considering randomness
Juels et al. focused on creating CSCs and left the conditions required to
institute them as open problems [22]. For example, most people might wait for
others to donate and decrypt a given film once the dealer releases all secret keys.
In this case, no one donates if all users choose this strategy; this is similar to the110
famous prisoner’s dilemma game [35]. It’s a common problem in the real world,
such as in free rider problems [14, 17]. These open problems can be summarized
as the following questions:
• What are the incentives for audiences to donate? It seems a better strategy
for them to wait until others have donated enough money for private115
information to be leaked. Therefore, it is possible for most audiences to
avoid donating. Juels et al. did not address this problem in detail [22].
• How much will each member of the audience donate and how many users
will donate? Suppose each member donates the same amount in case
he/she decides to donate. Let the donation ratio be the ratio of audience120
members who donate to the total number of audience members. Then,
the donation ratio has a significant influence on the decryption of all film
segments.
• When will the dealer have collected enough donations? In [22], the authors
only mentioned that the dealer decrypts all segments when he/she has125
collected enough donations; however, they do not explicitly highlight the
threshold of donations needed. This should be quantitatively stated so
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that the relationship between the donation ratio and total donations can
be clearly defined.
To answer the above questions, some factors need to be introduced to smart130
contracts to influence the audiences choice of strategy. In this study, we formu-
late these factors as randomness in the smart contract. Note that the first three
states are similar to those of PublicLeaks and the main forks start from state
S3. Randomness appears owing to several uncertain behaviors, including some
probability definitions and decision conditions. A significant distinction from135
PublicLeaks is the introduction of a malicious or amiable dealer. A malicious
dealer may sabotage the contract by deviating from it, such as by releasing
incorrect secret keys. By contrast, an amiable dealer may honor the contract
even if some conditions are not met, such as by releasing all secret keys even if
enough donations are not collected. The random values and parameters with140
respect to dealers of different types are listed below and summarized in Tables
2 and 3 .
• A malicious dealer may deliberately release n′ incorrect secret keys with
probability pr.
• To prevent a malicious dealer from revealing incorrect secret keys, the145
dealer should first be required to deposit d to the contract. This deposit
is not refunded if the dealer fails to reveal incorrect secret keys. We also
assume that there is a small probability (e.g., 0.01) that the dealer refuse
to deposit d to the contract.
• Let Aud = {Don,Don} denote the set of all audience members, where150
Don denotes audience members who donate and Don, those who do not
donate. We assume Don
⋃
Don = Aud for simplicity. Let k = |Don|
denote the cardinality of Don and Pp =
k
|Aud| , the ratio of k to the cardi-
nality of |Aud|.
• Let amt denote the amount donated by each audience member i ∈ Don155
and donation = k ∗ amt, the total donation.
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Table 2: Random values for smart contract.
Parameter Meaning
Pr Probability of revealing correct secret keys corresponding to n
′.
Pp Ratio of k to cardinality of |Aud|.
Pd Probability of dealer correctly decrypting the whole film.
Pl Probability of dealer being amiable.
Table 3: Parameters for smart contract.
Parameter Meaning
d Dealers deposit.
Aud Set of all audience members.
Don Subset of audience members who donate.
Don Subset of audience members who do not donate.
vfilm Value of the whole film.
amt Donation amount of each audience member.
k Number of audience members who donate.
donation Total donation amount.
expected Dealers expected value. Herein, we set expected = vfilm.
• An honest dealer should release all n secret keys with probability Pd once
donation is greater than vfilm. A malicious dealer may release incorrect
secret keys with probability 1− Pd.
• However, we allow an amiable dealer to decrypt the film with probability160
Pl by releasing all secret keys when the donations are close to his/her ex-
pected revenue. Let Pl = 1 − |expected−donation|expected , where donation denotes
the total donations and expected, the dealer’s expected revenue. We as-
sume that expected ≥ vfilm, where vfilm is the value of the film. We also
follow the idea in [6], where vfilm and Donation are exchanged between165
the dealer and Don once the smart contract is successfully implemented.
In other words, the dealer sells the film at price Donation, and members
of Don obtain vfilm for the film. Furthermore, we assume that only Don
may decrypt the entire film whereas Don may not. This assumption can
effectively prevent Don from free-riding.170
States of the PublicLeaksRandom model, which is based on PublicLeaks
[22], are explained in the following. Figure 2 shows state transitions.
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• Sini: The smart contract is initiated. The dealer must submit a deposit
d, and it is deducted if the dealer deviates from the smart contract.
• S0: The dealer decides whether to deposit. The state changes to terminal175
state Sabort if he/she does not make the deposit. We assume that there is
a small likelihood (e.g., 0.01) that the dealer does not make the deposit.
Otherwise, the dealer deposit d and the state changes to S1.
• Sabort: The contract is aborted. Note that the dealer deposits nothing.
• S1: The contract collects deposit d. The dealer divides film f (without180
copyright) into n segments fi (i ∈ [1, n]) and encrypts each segment fi
with secret key si. The state changes to S2.
• S2: Audience members belonging to Aud download all encrypted segments
c = {ci}i∈[1,n] = {Encki(fi)}i∈[1,n] from the contract. The state changes
to S3.185
• S3: The contract selects subset n′ ⊂ [1, n] of n. The state changes to S4.
• S4: The dealer reveals secret keys corresponding to n′. The state transi-
tions to terminal state Sfail with probability 1 − Pr if the dealer fails to
reveal the correct secret keys corresponding to n′. Otherwise, it proceeds
to state S5 with probability Pr.190
• Sfail: The contract terminates and d is not refunded to the dealer.
• S5: The set of audience members is divided into two subsets: Don and
Don. Audience members belonging to Don do not donate, and the state
changes to S6. Audience members belonging to Don donate amt, and the
state changes to S7.195
• S6: Audience members belonging to Don donate amt, and the state
changes to S8.
• S7: Audience members belonging to Don do not donate anything, and the
state changes to S8.
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• S8: The contract collects donations from k members and sets Donation =200
k ∗ amt. The state changes to S9 if Donation ≤ vfilm; otherwise, it
changes to S10.
• S9: Normally, the dealer may not decrypt all segments as Donation does
not reach the expected value expected. The contract ends at state Send and
the deposit is refunded to the dealer. However, we allow an amiable dealer205
to release the entire film if Donation is close to expected. Recall that the
dealer decrypts the film by releasing all secret keys with probability Pl.
Consequently, the state changes to Ssucc.
• S10: The dealer is willing to decrypt all segments, and the state changes
to Ssucc. However, there is still a small probability (e.g., 1 − Pd) that a210
malicious dealer incorrectly decrypts files, and the state changes to Sinc.
• Send: The contract is terminated. The donations are refunded to Don
and deposit d is refunded to the dealer.
• Sinc: The contract is terminated. The donations are refunded to Don but
deposit d is not refunded to the dealer.215
• Ssucc: The contract is terminated. The contract sends Donation and re-
funds the deposit to the dealer. Audience members, irrespective of whether
they have donated, download the entire film.
The smart contract of PublicLeaksRandom may solve the open problems
mentioned above by setting Donation > vfilm > amt.220
• The incentives for audiences to donate are similar to those in [22]. Howev-
er, audiences in Don are not allowed to decrypt the film in PublicLeaksRandom.
Therefore, audiences in Don cannot free-ride here.
• We consider the influence of the donation ratio on the decryption of all film
segments by formulating the random value Pp. Furthermore, we discuss225
the influence of donation value amt on the decryption of the entire film.
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• We consider different types of dealers—honest, malicious, and amiable;
this results in a diversity of terminal states compared with those in [22].
We stress on the problems of when the dealer has collected enough do-
nations and what he/she does once this has been done. For example, an230
amiable dealer may decrypt the entire film with probability Pl when the
donations are close to but have not reached vfilm. By contrast, a mali-
cious dealer may refuse to decrypt the entire film with probability 1− Pd
even if enough donations have been collected.
3. Simulations and results235
Figure 2 shows the state transitions of the smart contract, and Table 4 shows
the balance of each participant. In Figure 2, the rectangle denotes the terminal
state, and circles, triangles, and hexagons denote different nonterminal states.
Circles imply that the subject of the given state was part of the audience; the
subject could belong to Aud, Don, or Don. Triangles and hexagons imply that240
the subject of the given state was the dealer and the contract, respectively. The
dashed rectangle denotes the set of audience members Aud divided into two
subsets: Don and Don. In Figure 2, the terminal states of the contract are
Sabort, Sfail, Send ,Ssucc, and Sinc. Table 5 lists the terminal states and their
corresponding meanings.245
In [22], the authors illustrated the probability of reaching state Ssucc in s-
mart contract PublicLeaks. In this study, we consider further possibilities for
PublicLeaksRandom. For example, we consider the donation ratio Pp of au-
diences and the variation in donation amt. We also discuss different types of
dealers, such as malicious and amiable. The former has a small probability 1−Pd250
of incorrectly decrypting the entire film, whereas the latter has probability Pl of
decrypting the entire film even if he/she does not collect enough donations. The
main task is to learn the maximum probability of reaching each terminal state
and the influence of randomness/parameters on it. However, it is challenging to
prove through derivation of formulae. We thus simulated them by using PRISM255
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Figure 2: State transitions of PublicLeaksRandom.
[16, 24], a useful probabilistic model checker that is widely used for modeling
and verification of issues such as contract signing and analysis of anonymity
[25, 26, 37, 38, 34]. PRISM has been evaluated in [12]. Therefore, one or more
model properties are identified and implemented in PRISM’s property specifi-
cation language. The operator P is important in PRISMs property specification260
language; it can be used to calculate the probability of occurrence of an event,
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Table 4: Balance of PublicLeaksRandom.
State Contract Dealer
Audience
members in Don
Audience
members in Don
Sini,S0,Sabort 0
vfilm,
d
amt amt
S1,S2,S3,
S4,S5,Sfail
d vfilm amt amt
S6,S7,
S8,S9,S10
d,
Donation
vfilm 0 amt
Send 0
vfilm,
d
amt amt
Sinc d vfilm amt amt
Ssucc 0
d,
Donation
vfilm amt
Table 5: Terminal states of PublicLeaksRandom.
States Meaning
Sabort Dealer refuses to deposit and the contract aborts.
Sfail Dealer fail to decrypt part of the segments.
Send
Contract ends normally, and the dealer does not decrypt
all segments for audience members in Don.
Ssucc
Contract is successfully executed, and the dealer decrypts
all segments for audience members in Don.
Sinc
Dealer incorrectly decrypts
all segments for audience members in Don but is detected.
such as reaching a given state. For example, Pmax =?[F <= T target] denotes
the maximum probability of reaching target within time T .
In this study, we used the codes Pmax =?[F < 10 s = end], Pmax =?[F <
10 s = succ], and Pmax =?[F < 10 s = inc]1 to denote the maximum probabil-265
ities of reaching states Send, Ssucc, and Sinc, within time T , respectively
2. Note
that we did not analyze the maximum probabilities of termination states Sacort
and Sfail; these were fixed at 0.01 and Pr, respectively. We only simulated the
probabilities of terminal states Send, Ssucc, and Sinc.
1We used Pmax =?[F < 10 s = 11], Pmax =?[F < 10 s = 12], and Pmax =?[F < 10 s =
13] in the simulation as PRISM allows the states to be a set of integers.
2The time bound T in F < T does not influence the final simulation results. Therefore,
we set it to 10.
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We studied the combined influence of Pp and amt and the combined influence270
of Pp and Pl on the maximum probabilities of Send, Ssucc, and Sinc. Figures
3, 4, and 5 show the simulation results of Send, Ssucc, and Sinc, respectively.
The parameters were set as follows: Pr = 0.95, pd = 0.95, vfilm = 500,
k = |Aud| ∗ Pp, donate = k ∗ amt, and Pl = 1 − |vfilm−donate|vfilm . In Figure
3, the probability of reaching Send was approximately 0.95 when the audience275
donated nothing. There was still a small probability, 0.05, of reaching Ssucc
as the dealer might have been an amiable one. Given the fixed value of amt,
the higher the ratio of donations, the lower is the probability of reaching Send.
Given a fixed Pp, the higher the donation amt, the lower is the probability of
reaching Send. In other words, the probability of reaching Send was inversely280
proportional to the donation ratio and value. The probability rapidly decreased
to zero when the donation ratio Pp was higher than the threshold, 0.5. Pp = 0.5
was a watershed for the probability of Send to decrease to zero. The situation
for the probability of reaching Ssucc was opposite that of reaching Send.
In Figure 4, the probability of reaching Ssucc is proportional to the donation285
ratio and value. Similarly, Pp = 0.5 was a watershed for the probability of Ssucc
to reach 0.9. Here, the threshold was not one as a malicious dealer might have
incorrectly decrypted the film even if he/she had collected enough donations.
In Figure 5, the probability of reaching Sinc is close to 0.05 when Pp is greater
than 0.5. As with the threshold of Pp, the threshold of the donation value290
amt influenced the probabilities of reaching the terminal states, which changed
with Pp. For example, in Figure 4, the thresholds are amt = 6 and amt = 7
when Pp = 0.8 and Pp = 0.7, respectively. In other words, the higher the Pp
value, the smaller is amt. However, the thresholds were identical (amt = 5)
when Pp = 0.9 and Pp = 1. This means that the threshold was not infinitely295
small. The smallest threshold was amt = 5 as Pp = 1 was the maximum
probability. Figures 3, 4, and 5 highlight the influence of these thresholds on
the maximum probabilities. Therefore, the dealer should increase the thresholds
of the donation ratio and value if he/she manages to improve the probability of
reaching Ssucc. However, the thresholds cannot be increased infinitely.300
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Figure 3: Maximum probability of reaching Send.
Figure 4: Maximum probability of reaching Ssucc.
Figure 5: Maximum probability of reaching Sinc.
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We studied the influence of Pp and Pl on the probabilities of reaching each
terminal state. The parameters were set as follows: Pr = 0.95, Pd = 0.95,
amt = 1, vfilm = 500, k = |Aud| ∗Pp, and donate = k ∗ amt. Figures 6, 7, and
8 show the simulation results. The probability of reaching Send was inversely
proportional to Pp and Pl, and that of reaching Ssucc was proportional to Pp305
and Pl. However, the probability could not increase infinitely. In Figure 7, the
maximum probability decreases to 0.9 when Pp = 1. In Figure 8, the probabili-
ties were identical irrespective of Pl because they did not depend on Pl. Figures
6, 7, and 8 show the thresholds. Unlike the thresholds in Figures 3, 4, and 5,
these thresholds were distinct for Pp = 0.5. The thresholds were watersheds in-310
dicating whether Pl influenced the maximum probabilities, especially in Figures
6 and 7. In Figure 7, the maximum probability of reaching Ssucc is proportional
to Pl. The highest probability is 0.95 when Pp <= 0.5 and Pl = 1. In other
words, the smart contract could have been successfully executed with a higher
probability, say 0.95, if the dealer had been amiable when Pp was higher than315
the threshold. However, Pl was ineffective for the maximum probability when
Pp < 0.5. In Figure 7, the maximum probabilities with different values of Pl
reached a uniform value of 0.9 when Pp > 0.5. Therefore, it was better for the
dealer to increase the donation ratio (e.g., higher than 0.5) if he/she had biased
the smart contract to terminal state Ssucc.320
The simulation results show that the donation ratio Pp and donation value
amt had a significant influence on the success of the smart contract. The CSC
could be executed with high probability (e.g., 0.9) if all audience members had
donated (e.g., Pp = 1). This conclusion is consistent with that in [22]. The
dealer may thus improve the probability of success of the CSC by manipulating325
Pp and amt. It is not particularly challenging for the dealer to increase amt.
For example, the dealer can control amt by setting a minimum donation value.
Therefore, the bottleneck is controlling the Pp value; it should be at least greater
than 0.5 if the dealer manages to reach a high probability (e.g., 0.9). This means
that the dealer should control at least half the audience, which is challenging.330
Donating behavior in smart contracts features free-riding [32], where people
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Figure 6: Maximum probability of reaching Send with fixed Pr = Pd = 0.95 and amt = 1.
Figure 7: Maximum probability of reaching Ssucc where Pr = Pd = 0.95 and amt = 1.
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Figure 8: Maximum probability of reaching Sinc where Pr = Pd = 0.95 and amt = 1.
benefit without contribution. For example, in the popular P2P network Gnutella
[1], approximately 70% of users do not contribute to the system. Therefore, we
assumed that only 30% (Pp = 0.3) of audience members donated to CSCs. In
Figure 4, the probability is at most 0.25 when the CSC is successfully executed.335
In Figure 7, the probability can be very high (e.g., 0.95) when Pp = 0.3 and
Pl = 1. However, the premise is that the dealer is amiable. The Pl value
depends on the Pp value according to its definition. Therefore, Pl = 1 is not set
when Pp = 0.3.
The simulation results with respect to the maximum probability of reaching340
Ssucc were not satisfactory, especially when Pp was low. It became challenging
for the dealer to enforce the terms of the smart contract. In other words,
although the CSC proposed by [22] is feasible in theory, it is challenging to
implement.
4. Conclusions and future work345
The property of payment enforcement in smart contracts is used by users to
carry out illegal activities. As with real-world crimes, CSCs are not as powerful
as assumed. In this study, we examined the validity of CSCs and found that
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some parameters may reduce their power. We biased the CSC using several
forks by introducing random parameters.350
We then proposed a CSC based on new parameters that has five terminal
states, and we stress on three of them. The maximum probabilities of reaching
each terminal state were simulated by using PRISM. The destructive power of
our CSC was compromised as it was conditionally implemented with a rela-
tively low probability. The power of CSCs diminishes with the introduction of355
randomness. Future work should focus on reducing the probability (below 0.3)
of attaining the successful terminal state. Training smart contracts to escape
illegal activities through machine learning is another interesting topic in this
field.
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